Volume 1 (2006)
Issue 1
Issue 1 at Brill.comContents
Jan Melissen and Paul Sharp
Alan K. Henrikson
Abstract
In an attempt to think beyond the immediate horizon for diplomacy, five possible futures are envisioned. 'Disintermediation' suggests that diplomats, in competition with a dynamic private sector, may need to adopt business methods and use the internet — or be bypassed. 'Europeanization' could largely subordinate bilateral diplomacy within the regional European Union framework, although space might be left for 'public diplomatic' functions. International 'democratization' would accord a larger role to states hitherto excluded from decision-making within multilateral institutions, and also to civil society. 'Thematization' would require a higher degree of flexibility from diplomats as they engage in crusade-like efforts against terrorism, disease and other such threats. 'Americanization' implies the adjustment by diplomats to a world in which 'international relations' are conducted along the lines of US domestic politics, with lobbying and advocacy becoming major activities. The need to win greater public support, if not necessarily to involve the people directly in diplomacy, is evident in all of these 'projective visions'.
Brian Hocking and Donna Lee
Abstract
Diplomatic representation, both as a concept and in terms of its structures and processes, does not receive the attention that it deserves. This is surprising given that it forms a central concern for both analysts and practitioners of diplomacy, with the latter confronting multiple challenges in adapting modes of representation to changes in their international and domestic political environments. One facet of this can be identified in responses to factors that have assumed a significant place in the development of diplomacy — namely distance and proximity. To the growth of proximity in both spatial and issue-oriented terms, the challenge of the 'special relationship' is added in specific contexts. Both factors come together in the case of Canada's attempts to manage its policies towards the United States. Here, strategies have moved through distinct phases responding to domestic and international changes. The latest phase, which is associated with substantial rethinking of the role and structure of Foreign Affairs Canada, assumes the form of what has been labelled the Enhanced Representation Initiative (ERI). The ERI is interesting not only in the Canadian-US context, but because it reveals more general problems for governments seeking to manage the pressures of proximity and a growing number of relationships that assume aspects of 'specialness'.
Jozef Bátora
Abstract
Public diplomacy represents an opportunity for small and medium-sized states to gain infl uence and shape international agenda in ways that go beyond their limited hard power resources (related to size, military and economic strength). Th e literature on public diplomacy has been dominated by accounts of major powers, and the character of public diplomacy performed by small and mediumsized states has hardly been explored so far.
Based on an elaboration of the concept of soft power as being based on image and value assets of societal actors, this paper suggests a defi nition of public diplomacy as including activities by the state abroad and at home with the aim of increasing its attractiveness. Th ree areas in which the public diplomacy strategies of small and medium-sized states diff er from the corresponding activities of major powers are then suggested. Finally, the development of public diplomacy strategies and their coordination by the foreign ministries of Canada and Norway — two countries with widely similar foreign policy agendas but diff erent domestic constituencies — are then described and compared. The paper concludes by suggesting that successful public diplomacy by small and medium-sized states is well served by positioning the state not only in locally attractive image and value platforms, but also in their global equivalents.
Kishan S. Rana
Abstract
Singapore is a practitioner of focused, innovative diplomacy, constantly in search of the political space for itself that would overcome its sense of vulnerability resulting from its geopolitical location. This has entailed involving other states in its well-being, constantly searching for ways to make itself relevant to the international community, through niche diplomacy and a proactive style.It has been creative in its use of regional diplomacy. It runs a relatively small network of embassies, with strong centralized control through its foreign ministry; it has economized on its scarce resource — skilled manpower — through extensive use of 'non-resident ambassadors'. Poor accountability to publics, attrition of talent and gender inequality are among its few weaknesses. Some, but not all, of its methods are relevant to other small states.
Brian Crowe
Abstract
The Balkans have been the crucible of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the 1990s the appointment of David (Lord) Owen as a strong representative to manage the EU's Bosnian policy, the sidelining of the EU itself by the Contact Group, and American dominance at Dayton (what price 'this is the hour of Europe'?) and over Kosovo were important precursors to the important European Council decisions in June 1999 to appoint a high-profile international statesman as High Representative for the CFSP and to create the EU's own military capability in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Constitutional Treaty's further provisions, notably replacing the Presidency in external relations, will be sorely missed and will need to be brought back. ESDP is developing well, if modestly, and making a genuine contribution, mostly with a strong civ-mil component, in several parts of the world. The CFSP itself seems to be managing quite well. But the EU is not yet set up for serious 'events' or crisis management. Experience shows, and greater recognition is needed, that the EU (probably even with an EU Foreign Minister) needs to be represented by member states that carry conviction to outside interlocutors: some member states are inevitably more equal and carry greater weight than others, even if all have an equal voice. Since EU foreign policy is in large measure inescapably a function of US foreign policy, member states need to have a better common understanding among themselves about the nature of the transatlantic relationship. It will take confidence in the efficacy of the CFSP, to which all must give greater priority, before those member states that have alternatives will accept being bound to conducting their foreign policy (or being represented in the UN Security Council) through Brussels. at will take time and effort.
Publication date: 1 January 2006
Issue 2
Issue 2 at Brill.comContents
Dimitris Bourantonis
Jonas Tallberg
Abstract
The exercise of leadership by the chairs of multilateral negotiations has so far received limited systematic attention in scholarship on international cooperation. This article addresses this gap by presenting a rational institutionalist theory of formal leadership that provides answers to three central questions: Why do states delegate powers of process control to the chairmanship of international negotiations? What are the power resources of formal leaders? And when, why and how do negotiation chairs wield influence over the outcomes of multilateral bargaining? The theory suggests that chairmanships are empowered to fulfil functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation in international bargaining; identifies procedural control and privileged information as essential power resources of negotiation chairs; and isolates the conditions under which formal leaders shape the efficiency and distributional implications of multilateral bargaining. The article ends by outlining an alternative theoretical approach to formal leadership, drawn from sociological institutionalism.
Spyros Blavoukos, Panayotis Tsakonas and Dimitris Bourantonis
Abstract
The article discusses the parameters conditioning the chair's effectiveness in international multilateral negotiations. Building on existing accounts of Presidential functions, an analytical typology of these parameters is provided, elaborating on the direction and magnitude of their impact. Conditioning parameters are clustered into three categories: the broader international environment in which the chair operates and the issues with which (s)he is called to deal; organization-specific features of an institutional and political nature; and the chair's personal skills and country-of-origin attributes. The potential for effect of these parameters is illustrated by reference to the chairmanship of the UN Security Council (SC). The origins, institutional features and main tasks of the Council are discussed, as well as the role of its chair as an agenda manager and broker. It is argued that the SC President's role well exceeds the formal tasks that are stipulated in the Rules of Procedure. Although mainly procedural in nature, these tasks may have important political implications, stressing the informal component of Presidential intervention. The conditioning parameters identified have a catalytic impact upon and account for the great variance in SC chair performance and the effectiveness of the chair's intervention.
Ole Elgström
Abstract
Using role theory as its analytical basis, this article delineates and analyses the specific characteristics of the Chair in the European Union (EU). The focus is thus on the EU Council Presidency and on how expectations surrounding the office impact upon its performance as administrator, agenda manager, broker, leader and representative. The EU's institutional design is marked by a rotating Presidency, by relatively short Presidency periods and by a mix of unanimity and majority voting. These traits influence the ways in which the Chair performs its role. The major argument is, however, that existing structurally based expectations of the Presidency's role (that is, expectations of neutrality and impartiality, of effectiveness and of consensus-seeking) interact with the particular role conceptions that are brought to the office by individual member states to produce both common features and variety in role performance. Empirical illustrations are taken from recent EU Presidencies to highlight continuity and fluctuation in Presidency performances.
John Hemery and Paul Meerts
Abstract
This article draws on the experience of two series of courses in negotiation and chairing, fifty in all, conducted in preparation for the UK and Finnish Presidencies of the European Union, 2005 and 2006. It outlines the concept and design of the programme, and introduces a four-part analysis of the chair's role which provided the intellectual framework for the series. It examines in detail the structure of the courses and the practical exercises which formed the core of the training. A concluding section draws together the lessons learned. The article would be helpful specifically to those preparing officials for the Presidency of the EU, but also for multilateral negotiations more generally, as well as to those interested in the theory and practice of chairing.
Publication date: 1 January 2006
Issue 3
Issue 3 at Brill.comContents
Juergen Kleiner
Abstract
After the Taliban had become a permanent factor in Afghan politics at the beginning of 1995, the US administration started talking to them, mainly through the American Embassy in Islamabad. Declassified documents about the administration's dealings with the Taliban, which were obtained and published by the National Security Archive, give insight into the relationship between the two unlikely partners. The Americans discussed various issues with the Taliban, such as peace in Afghanistan, the fight against narcotics, human rights, the proposed Unocal gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, and terrorism. The Taliban demanded recognition as Afghanistan's legitimate government and wanted access to additional revenue. American talks with the Taliban survived the deterioration of the relationship from original friendliness to opposition to the promotion of sanctions and finally to threats. Since the end of summer 1998, a solution to the issue of Osama Bin Laden has been the US administration's top issue. The Americans asked the Taliban with urgency to take Bin Laden into custody or to expel him. The US administration, however, did not offer the Taliban anything in return. Persuasion was not enough to achieve the desired result and the administration's strategy was self-defeating.
Silviya Lechner
Abstract
The legal status of diplomats underwent a dramatic change between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries as a consequence of a transformed European states-system. Its transformation is linked to ius inter gentes, a 'law between nations' whose emergence not only created a Europe of sovereign states but simultaneously affected the scope, definition and justification of rights and duties held by diplomatic representatives. It is generally acknowledged that diplomacy as an institution exists by virtue of rules that are embodied in the modern system of states and defined as 'international society' or the 'society of states'. What needs to be better understood is that diplomatic rights and duties are made possible by this framework of an international society, which has discernible historical and analytical boundaries, and that the relationship between such a framework and its diplomatic institutions is not contingent but logical.
John Young
Abstract
While summits are well served in the literature on diplomacy, the focus tends to be on specific, high-profile occasions such as Munich and Yalta or on the broad experience of multilateral conferences. Such approaches may obscure the full range of summits that were taking place by the later twentieth century. By focusing on a four-year period in the experience of a particular leader, this article provides a case study of summitry, which might serve as the basis for comparisons with other countries and time periods. It draws out the frequency, type and geographical range of summits experienced by Edward Heath as British premier and, in doing so, also raises issues about how types of summits are defined, the relationship between bilateral and multilateral meetings and the way that summitry has evolved as a diplomatic practice. In particular it emerges that summits were frequent and ofen perfunctory affairs, sometimes held as a simple courtesy to leaders who were passing through London. In this sense the British experience may have been unusual, but it is also evident from the number of Heath's interlocutors and the multilateral conferences that he attended that summits had become an integral part of political life for world leaders in the jet age.
John Brady Kiesling
Abstract
The poor outcome of the Iraq War has highlighted the usefulness of 'reality-based' foreign policy. Yet the personal and professional consequences of dissent remain high in the US (and every other) diplomatic service. The Dissent Channel, currently underutilized, was designed to protect both the US State Department and its employees from bureaucratic retaliation for unwelcome real-world expertise. It should be reinvigorated. However, the unimpressive policy impact of dissent, whether through institutional channels or public resignations, makes it clear that effective dissent requires mobilizing the domestic political process as a force multiplier. Good dissent raises the political price of foreign policy blunders, and only through turning a bureaucratic system painfully against itself can blunders actually be prevented.
Publication date: 1 January 2006