Featured Review | China’s foreign policy contradictions lessons from China’s R2P, Hong Kong, and WTO policy
Rühlig, Tim Nicholas, ed., China’s foreign policy contradictions lessons from China’s R2P, Hong Kong, and WTO policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022). Pp. xvi +259. €90.81 (Hardcover). €51.12 (E-Book). ISBN-13: 979-8212055383.
Behind China’s contradictory foreign polices: bridging domestic challenges and global ambitions
The influential literature on China's rise, particularly the works of prominent scholars such as John Mearsheimer, often prioritises mainstream International Relations (IR) theories [1]. IR literature primarily debates whether China's actions reflect realist tendencies, particularly in the context of a potential clash between the United States and China and seeks to identify theoretical frameworks that elucidate the perceived ‘China threat’. Rühlig's book offers an alternative to the prevalent 'China threat' theory and instead focuses on understanding how China's foreign policy is deeply influenced and shaped by domestic decisions and internal constraints. Observed contradictions in China’s foreign policy are linked back to different domestic actors pursuing conflicting policies, as a response to domestic constraints and economic and political vulnerabilities (84). This nuanced approach highlights the interplay between domestic decision-making processes and international strategies, providing valuable insights into the origins and nature of these contradictions. Ultimately, Rühlig’s analysis provides a bottom-up comprehension of China’s international behaviour, enabling more informed predictions about its actions and underlying motivations. Rühlig’s impressive attempt at unravelling the enigma of China’s party-state and its foreign decision-making at the subnational level is substantiated by a unique collection of over 150 in-depth semi-structured and ethnographic interviews (17).
First, Rühlig addresses China’s approach to the evolving and contested norm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). China has long upheld the Westphalian model of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, fearing that humanitarian intervention could be used as a pretext to undermine sovereignty (46). China approved the R2P's first two pillars, which determine the responsibility of each state to protect its population and the responsibility of the international community to assist states in protecting their populations. This norm adherence, Rühlig argues, is prescribed in China’s strategy to enhance its international reputation as a responsible and constructive global stakeholder (59). However, China remains reluctant to accept the third pillar, which emphasizes the international community's responsibility to protect when a state is clearly failing to protect its population [2]. With China framing the issue in legal rather than political terms, this ambivalent position on R2P is considered self-serving. Indeed, it allows China to depoliticise the issue and retain control over its interpretation and application, the latter having to be voted as a resolution in the Security Council, where China is a permanent member and holds veto power. Rühlig grounds his argument of why China allowed for a NATO-led R2P intervention in Libya (2011) but vetoed any resolutions that would allow for foreign intervention in Syria (2013) on the two pillars of domestic legitimacy, meaning economic legitimacy and national pride, which fuel its foreign policy. He argues that these pillars create a calculated flexibility, enabling China to selectively support or oppose interventions based on their alignment with domestic stability and strategic interests.
The second part of the analysis pertains to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) approach towards Hong Kong (HK) under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ framework. Rühlig argues that despite the widespread HK independence movement, which threatened CCP control, it showed restraint on imposing its National Security Law until 2020. Yet, it took a hardline stance on electoral reform of the Chief Executive under Art. 45 of the Basic Law. The Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law’s vague legal interpretations allow for the depoliticisation of HK’s autonomy and for China to employ an instrumental approach to law by treating “law as a means to power, not as a constraint on it” (120). Thus, in 2020, despite the National Security Law violating the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, reputational costs were lower due to the COVID-19 pandemic. China’s policy decisions are explained by its delicate balancing act between maintaining domestic legitimacy through control (for the purpose of reunification) and avoiding international backlash as HK’s economic prosperity and local elites remain of vital interest and strategic value.
The third part analyses China’s international trade policy, specifically focusing on how inherent contradictions between free trade and protectionism intersect with its pursuit of economic performance legitimacy. These contradictions result from trade-offs between the two legitimacy pillars and the dual nature of the party-state's institutional structure, which combines a centralized hierarchy with elements of decentralization and fragmentation (19). Indeed, Rühlig’s analysis of the subnational sphere, meaning the local cadre system, is very compelling as it uncovers how local cadres adopt a more assertive nationalist perspective, which leads to protectionist and non-compliant behaviour towards WTO laws, especially in the banking sector. Financial repression is employed as a strategy to ensure party-state control. In contrast, trade issues and financial institutions exposed to international contexts are integral to China’s international reputation and face more pressure to liberalise market reforms. Rühlig’s findings highlight the antithetical tension between open and closed, decentralisation and recentralisation, free market and stat-owned economy (37). Thus, decentralisation and recentralization exist in parallel and Xi Jinping’s recent recentralisation efforts, while consolidating central authority, are not only indicative of Xi’s power but are also a reaction to domestic vulnerabilities (37-38).
The merits in Rühlig’s comprehensive research lie in using empirical examples to demonstrate the intricate balance China maintains between appearing cooperative internationally and protecting its core domestic interests. In the case of R2P norms, China successfully retained control over the third pillar’s application by framing it in legal rather than political terms. The same instrumental approach to law is explored in the context of the CCP’s relation with Hong Kong, which underscores how control is flexibly balanced to maintain domestic legitimacy while mitigating international backlash. Lastly, the CCP’s vulnerable domestic legitimacy necessitates trade-offs between strategies aimed at securing legitimacy through national pride and economic performance. These trade-offs are prescribed in a fragmented and decentralised party-state. The flexible use of control to mitigate domestic or international backlash results in a contradictory foreign policy. However, the first section on R2P can be criticized, as Rühlig himself acknowledges that since the start of the R2P discussion, China emphasised the importance it attributes to regional actors. In Libya, actors such as the League of Arab States requested the UNSC to mandate a no-fly zone. In Syria, however, Chinese officials rightly highlighted that no regional consensus existed. Thus, Rühlig wrongly argues that “the conditions in Libya and Syria were fairly similar” (82), as some consistency in China’s application of R2P can be discerned by respecting regional actors’ consensus.
In conclusion, policymakers and academics cannot ignore the potentially far-reaching transformations that China’s instrumental approach to international law is fueling, as it undermines the core vocabulary of global politics and questions the traditional meaning of the rule of law and democracy. Through its flexible application of R2P norms and the WTO rules and by advocating for “varieties of free trade”, China is maintaining its state-permeated economy and manifesting a more plural and fragmented international order. Despite Xi’s attempts at recentralisation, the local cadre system will not be dissolved and further research on the subnational impact of this system should focus on how it permeates the survival of state control in all spheres of life. Understanding and contextualising these vulnerabilities would enable policymakers to make more nuanced and well-informed decisions regarding China’s ambitions, such as Xi Jinping promoting China as a reliable and responsible partner through global infrastructure projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (31). Overreliance on the ‘China threat’ theory and dominant superpower narratives often obscures, distorts and undermines a critical understanding of the complex interplay between China's centralised power hierarchy and the institutional rivalries which lead to a contradictory foreign policy, carrying significant implications for the liberal international order.
Caroline Seil is a second year student in the Advanced MSc International Relations and Diplomacy at Leiden University, The Hague Campus.
[1] Mearsheimer 2001.
[2] Garwood-Gowers 2016, 79.
Bibliography
Garwood-Gowers , A. (2015). China’s “Responsible Protection” Concept: Reinterpreting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes. Asian Journal of International Law, 6(1), 89–118. https://doi.org/10.1017/s2044251314000368
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (pp. 1–28). (W.W. Norton & Company).
Rühlig, T. (2022). China’s foreign policy contradictions lessons from China’s R2P, Hong Kong, and WTO policy. New York Oxford University Press.